I am a philosopher and writer (of sorts) based in New York City. My interests are primarily in the theoretical development of the concept of necessity throughout Western modernity, discerning an important difference between the grammar of moral and existential “need.” It is a vocational mission of mine to seek those things which are most important for a good life while preserving the importance of pluralistic modes of being as sacred in their own ways. I am currently interested in the Hebraic / biblical concept of “election” as well as the relationship between existential and moral necessity, and their usefulness in understanding contemporary ethical problems including personal identity, leadership, institutional responsibility, and resource distribution. I completed my undergraduate studies at the CUNY Baccalaureate for Unique and Interdisciplinary Studies with a concentration in Philosophy and Social Theory and I hold a master’s degree in Philosophy from The New School for Social Research.
For work, I am a higher education data and systems analyst with expertise in business data management and solutions. My joy is in being a volunteer speech and debate coach for high school boys at my own alma mater.
The hypothesis proffered in this essay is that the text of Genesis 3:16 can illuminate compelling evidence that a hermeneutic of reconciliation may do away with questions of inconsistency in scriptural moralizing by showing that 1) the text speaks about the reconciliation of humans with God or that 2) the same text speaks about the reconciliation of humans with one another. To support this claim, I use the text of Genesis 3 as a case study in the sort of exegetical framework I aim to defend. The study does not serve to propose a normative content of interpretation, but rather is exemplary of the formal structure of a hermeneutics of reconciliation; one by which a canonical exegesis can reasonably tell of remediation as clear and distinct from other interpretations which view God and salvation as disciplinary.